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Preface by the CRESR Directors
CRESR at 30: 1987-2017
The Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research (CRESR)
at Shefﬁeld Hallam University was established in 1987. Over the
last thirty years we have undertaken more than 500 projects for UK
government departments, research councils, research charities,
devolved administrations, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the European Commission,
and many other organisations, exploring relationships across policy,
people and places. There are two reasons why we think now is an
especially apt time to reﬂect on that experience. 
First, at a time of political, economic and social turmoil there is an
inevitable tendency to focus on the here and now. However, creative
solutions rarely emerge from short-termism and political expediency.
We are witnessing a marked break with long-run post-war trends,
the intensiﬁcation of long-standing issues and problems, and the
emergence of new challenges. Now is not the time for collective
policy amnesia. It is a time to take stock, reassess and reconsider;
to take the long view and reﬂect on lessons to be drawn from previous
policies, strategies and initiatives in order to chart a way forward. 
Second, there is an urgent need to discuss the role of evidence in
the formulation of public policy. Policy making rooted in evidence and
analysis is out of favour. Political debate appears more interested in
appealing to emotion, speculation and imagery. Facts are seen as
irrelevant and experts as dour pessimists. This rejection of evidence
in favour of supposed ‘common sense’ thinking in practice risks
distancing policy from the lived realities of the people and places
it should be serving. The result is policy that misunderstands what
is going on, does little to make things better and can often make
them worse.  
Over the last 30 years, we have teased out a rich evidence base,
often working in partnership with other researchers. Much of this
work has been commissioned directly by government departments
and agencies: it is perverse that ﬁndings emerging from publicly
funded research should be so rapidly discarded. In response, we
are publishing a series of themed reviews that reach across CRESR’s
expertise between November 2016 and summer 2017. Each will
address a broad area of policy within which CRESR has operated.
The particular slant they take will vary, but the reviews will be united
by a commitment to bridge the gulf that has opened up between the
ostensibly ambitious rhetoric of many government initiatives and
the harsh realities of life for many places and people who are
increasingly becoming the ‘unconnected’. 
We hope readers enjoy these reviews; we welcome comments
and feedback on them. 
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An indication of the range of
organisations with which we
have worked, and the nature
of some of these projects,
can be found at
www.shu.ac.uk/cresr.
CRESR Directors: 1986-2016
Professor Paul Lawless 1986–2003
Professor Ian Cole 2003–2010
Professor Peter Wells 2010–2013
Professor David Robinson 2014–2016
Key Points
●UK manufacturing employment has fallen from 8.9 million
to just 2.9 million over the last fifty years, and 500,000 jobs
have disappeared from the coal industry. This has destroyed 
the economic base of many communities, especially in the 
North, Scotland and Wales.
●The main effect of this job loss has been to divert vast numbers 
of men and women out of the labour market onto incapacity-
related benefits, these days Employment and Support 
Allowance (ESA) which accounts for almost 2.5 million adults 
ofworkingage.The highest claimant rates – 10 per cent or more
of all 16-64 year olds – are nearly all in older industrial areas.
●ESA and the additional benefits received by ESA claimants – 
Housing Benefit and Disability Living Allowance for example – 
are a £30bn-plus annual claim on the Exchequer.
●Low pay in former industrial areas depresses tax revenue and 
inflates spending on in-work benefits. Spending on Tax 
Credits, for example, exceeds £850 a year per adult of working 
age in much of older industrial Britain – double the level in parts 
of southern England.
●The Treasury has misdiagnosed high welfare spending as
the result of inadequate work incentives and has too often 
blamed individuals for their own predicament, whereas in fact 
a large part of the bill is rooted in job destruction extending 
back decades.
●The welfare reforms implemented since 2010, and 
strengthened since the 2015 general election, hit the  poorest 
places hardest. In effect, communities in older industrial 
Britain are being meted out punishment in the form of welfare 
cuts for the destruction wrought to their industrial base.
●Across most of older industrial Britain the loss arising from 
welfare reform is expected to exceed £750 a year per working 
age adult by 2020-21.
●There is an alternative – a genuine rebalancing of the economy 
in favour of industrial production and a revival of regional 
economic policy.
●Policy makers need to take a long-term perspective, look at the
differences between places, and stop thinking in silos.
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UK manufacturing employment has
fallen from 8.9 million to just 2.9 million
over the last fifty years, and 500,000
jobs have disappeared from the coal
industry. This has destroyed the
economic base of many communities,
especially in the North, Scotland
and Wales.
The contemporary UK economy
Most discussion about the economy is framed within short
time-horizons, with general elections or at most changes in
government setting the outer edges of memory and debate.
This focus may convey immediacy and relevance but the
effect is all too often to obscure the longer-term issues and
trends.
So in the autumn of 2016 it is the consequences of the UK’s
vote to leave the European Union that dominate the economic
debate. Brexit is unquestionably important, even if the result
of the referendum has not yet had quite the impact that was
anticipated, but its potential consequences pale by
comparison with the cumulative effects, year on year, of
underlying economic trends.
In the UK, the deﬁning feature of the economy over the last
thirty or forty years has been the big shift away from industry
as an employer and generator of wealth. That this
‘deindustrialisation’ has happened is widely understood.
It is part of the backdrop to modern life. Yet the massive
consequences for the contemporary economy and for
present-day policy making are generally overlooked. This is
unfortunate because major economic changes, such as
deindustrialisation, have impacts that spill over from decade
to decade.
In this short paper we aim to explain how the loss of Britain’s
industrial base sets the context for present-day public
ﬁnances. In doing so, we draw in particular on our own
research at CRESR over the last three decades. Individual
components of this research provide pieces of the jigsaw,
but by combining all the pieces and drawing on wider ideas
in economics to ﬁll in some of the gaps the overall picture
becomes clear.
In brief, our argument is that the destruction of industrial jobs,
which was so marked in the 1980s and early 90s but has
continued on and off ever since, fuelled spending on welfare
beneﬁts which in turn has compounded the budgetary
problems of successive governments. And with the present
government set on welfare reform, the places that bore the
brunt of job destruction some years ago are now generally
facing the biggest reductions in household incomes. There is
a continuous thread linking what happened to British industry
in the 1980s, via the Treasury’s budgetary calculations, to
what is today happening on the ground in so many hard-
pressed communities.
In particular, we demonstrate these links by deploying
local data. This has been the distinctive contribution of our
research (and of CRESR more generally) and its value is that
it provides not just a level of detail that would otherwise be
missing but, more importantly, it sheds light on the underlying
processes at work. The Treasury knows it has a problem
balancing public ﬁnances, and that the government spends
an awful lot on working-age welfare beneﬁts. But it never
seems to ask exactly where – which towns and cities – draw
so heavily on beneﬁts, or why these communities have
become so dependent on welfare spending.
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The destruction of industrial Britain
It is appropriate to begin by outlining the scale of industrial
job loss and its distinctive geography. For those who lived
through the 1980s and early 90s as adults this will be a familiar
story but it is perhaps best not to take too much knowledge
for granted.
Britain was once a major industrial employer. Back in 1966,
when manufacturing employment peaked, 8.9 million worked
in manufacturing and a further 500,000 in the coal industry.
This compares with just 2.9 million employed in manufacturing
in 2016,1 and none at all in the coal industry except at a
handful of opencast sites and tiny drift mines. The shift
from manufacturing to service sector employment is a
phenomenon shared by other advance economies,2 rooted
in differential rates of productivity growth and accentuated
by globalisation and the rise of China, in particular, as a
competitor. But in Britain the process of deindustrialisation
has gone further and faster than just about anywhere else.
As Figure 1below shows, manufacturing employment fell
especially steeply in the early 1980s in a recession triggered
by a high exchange rate and high interest rates. The recession
of the early 1990s added further pain. Thereafter,
manufacturing employment failed to recover even though the
UK economy enjoyed ﬁfteen years of sustained economic
growth. For the coal industry (which statisticians don’t include
within ‘manufacturing’), the biggest job losses started a little
later, after the 1984/5 miners’ strike, but by 1992 when the
‘Heseltine’ round of pit closures was announced two-thirds
of the pre-strike workforce had already gone. The ﬁnal colliery
closed in 2015.
These industrial job losses were concentrated in speciﬁc parts
of the country – mostly but not exclusively in ‘older industrial
Britain’. Towns and cities in the North of England, and to a
lesser extent in the Midlands, were especially badly hit. The
West of Scotland around Glasgow, and South Wales were
similarly affected. In many cases the economic base of whole
communities was destroyed. By contrast, London escaped
relatively lightly and so did most of its vast hinterland in the
South and East of England.
Partly this pattern reﬂected the pre-1980 location of UK
manufacturing, and coal-mining of course only took place
where there was coal to be mined. Partly the pattern of job
loss reﬂected the location of the industries that shrank most –
coal, steel, shipbuilding, heavy engineering, textiles etc. And
partly it was attributable to the closure of branch factories in
the ‘assisted areas’ that had opened in the post-war years
of economic growth and strong regional policy.3
Figure 2, opposite, illustrates the geography of this job loss.
This map does not purport to show the location of every
major industrial closure or redundancy over the last three
and a half decades but rather to give a ﬂavour of which
industries have shrunk or disappeared from which locations.
The concentration in a number of speciﬁc areas is especially
noticeable. It is not the whole of the North, nor indeed the
whole of Scotland or Wales, that has been in the ﬁring line –
many rural areas, for example, were less affected. It s the
industrial cities, towns and coalﬁeld areas that suffered the
big job losses. This is a distinctive geography that recurs in
the evidence we present later.
1.GB data for the year
to March 2016.  Source:
Labour Force Survey.
2. See in particular
R Rowthorn and J Wells
(1987) Deindustrialisation
and Foreign Trade, CUP,
Cambridge
3.S Fothergill and N Guy
(1991) Retreat from the
Regions: corporate change
and the closure of factories,
Jessica Kingsley / Regional
Studies Association,
London.
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Figure 1: UK manufacturing employment 1978-2016
Source: ONS
Figure 2: Major industrial job losses
since the early 1980s
● Coal
● Steel
● Motor vehicles
● Shipbuilding and engineering
● Textiles and clothing
● Other manufacturing
Source: Sheffield Hallam University
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Labour market adjustment
The 1980s are remembered as a period of high unemployment.
The number of claimant unemployed – that is, the number
out-of-work claiming unemployment beneﬁts – hovered
around 3 million for a number of years, which was perhaps to
be expected given the scale of the job loss. But after the early
1990s recession, claimant unemployment fell away, declining
to under 1 million for most of the 2000s, and after the 2008
ﬁnancial crisis returning to below 1 million once more. If
claimant unemployment alone were to be the sole guide it
might be argued that the UK economy has got over
deindustrialisation.
Unfortunately, this optimistic assessment is wide of the mark.
A closer look at how labour markets have adjusted explains why.
We ﬁrst became interested in labour market adjustment in
the context of the UK coal industry. By the early 1990s most of
the pits had shut but claimant unemployment in the coalﬁelds
was no higher than when the pits had been working. This was
not what most observers had expected. We therefore picked
apart the trends in the coalﬁeld labour market.4 How much
of the low claimant unemployment could be explained by
commuting to neighbouring areas, by out-migration, or by new
job creation? The conclusion, based on Census data, was in
fact that the main response to coal job loss was a diversion of
working-age men into ‘economic inactivity’. Looking closer,
this was primarily a withdrawal from the labour market into
what the Census called ‘permanent sickness’ – in practice
onto incapacity-related beneﬁts. So job loss had indeed
resulted in a lasting increase in beneﬁt claims but not in the
way that had been expected.
In a follow-up study5 we brought the ﬁgures forward by a
decade or so. A lot more had happened, particularly on the job
creation front, but the fundamental conclusion remained the
same: the big labour market adjustment in response to coal
job losses was an increase in ‘economic inactivity’ among
working age men. Furthermore, because many of the ex-
miners themselves had by then reached state pension age
it was clear that the increase in economic activity must be
occurring much more widely across the local workforce. In
effect, job loss for one generation was being passed on as
higher economic inactivity among the next. By 2008,
‘economic inactivity’ among working age men in the English
and Welsh coalﬁelds was still 150,000 higher than at the
beginning of the 1980s.6
The coalﬁelds pointed the way but it quickly became apparent
that their experience was not unique. Across the whole of older
industrial Britain, from the mid-1980s through to the early
2000s there was a huge surge in the numbers out of the labour
market – ‘economically inactive’ – on incapacity-related
beneﬁts.7
We argued that much of the increase in incapacity numbers
was a form of ‘hidden unemployment’. These were men and
women who in a fully employed economy might have been
expected to be in work but whose health problems or
disabilities entitled them to incapacity-related beneﬁts (these
days Employment and Support Allowance) instead of
unemployment beneﬁts. Our estimates of the scale of hidden
unemployment adjust for underlying variations in the extent
of ill health. The most recent ﬁgures, for 2012,8 suggest that
as many as 900,000 unemployed are hidden on incapacity-
related beneﬁts, only around 100,000 down on our very ﬁrst
estimate for 1997.9
The increase in incapacity numbers in older industrial Britain
occurred among women as well as men. At ﬁrst this seemed
hard to understand because the heavy industries shedding
jobs had previously mainly employed men. What became
apparent, after much detailed research in the former
coalﬁelds10 and elsewhere,11 is that these days the male and
female sides of the labour market interact so that a shortfall in
opportunities for men is transmitted, through competition
for jobs, to a difﬁcult local labour market for women in the
same places. Out-of-work women with health problems or
disabilities generally end up on incapacity-related beneﬁts
just like their male counterparts.
So via the study of local data it became possible to draw ﬁrm
conclusions about what really happened in response to the
large-scale loss of jobs in older industrial Britain. Yes, claimant
unemployment did fall back to low levels. But the near-
permanent effect has been to raise incapacity claimant
numbers, both among men and women.
4. C Beatty and S Fothergill
(1996) ‘Labour market
adjustment in areas of
chronic industrial decline:
the case of the UK
coalﬁelds’,Regional Studies,
vol. 30, pp. 637-650.
5. C Beatty, S Fothergill and
R Powell (2007) ‘Twenty
years on: has the economy
of the UK coalﬁelds
recovered?, Environment
and PlanningA, vol. 39, pp.
1654-1675.
6. M Foden, S Fothergill and
T Gore (2014) The State of
the Coalfields, CRESR,
Shefﬁeld Hallam University.
http://www4.shu.ac.uk/
research/cresr/sites/shu.ac.
uk/ﬁles/state-of-the-
coalﬁelds.pdf. C Beatty
(2016) ‘Two become one:
the integration of the male
and female labour markets
in the English and Welsh
coalﬁelds, Regional Studies,
vol. 50, pp. 823-834.
7. C Beatty and S Fothergill
(2005) ‘The diversion from
‘unemployment’ to
‘sickness’ across British
regions and districts’,
Regional Studies, vol. 39,
pp. 837-854.
8. C Beatty, S Fothergill and
T Gore (2012) The Real Level
of Unemployment 2012,
CRESR, Shefﬁeld Hallam
University. http://www4.shu.
ac.uk/research/cresr/sites/s
hu.ac.uk/ﬁles/real-level-of-
unemployment-2012.pdf 
9. C Beatty, S Fothergill,
T Gore and A Herrington
(1997) The Real Level of
Unemployment, CRESR,
Shefﬁeld Hallam University.
http://www4.shu.ac.uk/
research/cresr/sites/
shu.ac.uk/ ﬁles/the-real-
level-unemployment-
1997.pdf 
10. C Beatty (2016) ‘Two
become one: the integration
of the male and female
labour markets in the English
and Welsh coalﬁelds,
Regional Studies, vol. 50,
pp. 823-834.
11. C Beatty, S Fothergill,
D Houston, R Powell and
P Sissons (2009) Women on
Incapacity Benefits, CRESR,
Shefﬁeld Hallam University.
http://www4.shu.ac.uk/
research/cresr/sites/shu.ac.
uk/ﬁles/women-incapacity-
beneﬁts_0.pdf 
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The impact on present-day welfare spending
We can now begin to explore what this has meant for welfare
spending and for the Treasury’s struggle to balance public
ﬁnances. It is appropriate to begin by looking at the numbers
claiming the three main out-of-work beneﬁts, shown in
Figure 3 for 1979 to 2016 for Britain as a whole.
As we noted earlier, the numbers claiming unemployment
beneﬁts – Jobseeker’s Allowance from 1996 onwards and
Universal Credit more recently – reached 3 million in the mid-
1980s, fell back, rose again in the early 1990s, then declined
to well under a million. In the wake of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis
the numbers peaked at around 1.5 million before falling back
once more. Older industrial Britain, with around 30 per cent
of the GB population,12 still has 42 per cent of the claimant
unemployed.13
The number claiming lone parent beneﬁts – Income Support
for most of this period – rose from around 300,000 at the start
of the 1980s to a peak of around 1 million in the mid-1990s.
The evidence on the geography of lone parent claims14
pointed clearly to job loss among men as a key factor. In the
places where men’s jobs had disappeared, such as older
industrial Britain, the ability of men to provide ﬁnancial support
to women and children had been eroded. More recently,
the numbers on lone parent beneﬁts have fallen, not least
because eligibility has gradually been restricted just to those
with the very youngest children.
The striking feature in Figure 3, however, is the rise in the
numbers out-of-work on incapacity-related beneﬁts, from
around 750,000 to a plateau of around 2.5 million. The
numbers have declined a little from the all-time high in the
early 2000s but not by much.
The main effect of this job
loss has been to divert vast
numbers of men and women
out of the labour market onto
incapacity-related benefits,
these days Employment and
Support Allowance (ESA)
which accounts for almost
2.5 million adults of working
age. The highest claimant
rates – 10 per cent or more of
all 16-64 year olds – are nearly
all in older industrial areas.
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12. Industrial Communities
Alliance (2015) Whose
Recovery? How the upturn
in economic activity is
leaving older industrial
Britain behind, ICA, Barnsley.
http://www.industrialcomm
unitiesalliance.org/uploads/
2/6/2/0/2620193/whose_
recovery_report.pdf 
13. August 2016
14. R Rowthorn and
D Webster (2008) ‘Male
worklessness and the rise of
lone parenthood in Great
Britain’, Cambridge Journal
of Regions, Economy and
Society, vol. 1, pp. 69-88. 
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Figure 3: Working age benefit claimants, 1979-2016
Source: DWP
Incapacity-related benefits
There are two remarkable aspects of the incapacity numbers.
First, they are largely invisible. The ﬁgures surface in the media
from time to time but probably few beyond those who follow
these issues would be aware that the numbers currently out-
of-work on incapacity-related beneﬁts exceed the numbers
on unemployment beneﬁts by more than three-to-one and
that, the immediate post-ﬁnancial crisis years excepted, this
has been the situation since the end of the 1990s.
The other remarkable aspect of the incapacity numbers is that
they have stayed so high for so long despite multiple efforts
to bring them down. Reform in 1995 introduced more formal
medical tests. More restrictive eligibility rules were introduced
in 1999. A Pathways to Work programme for claimants was
introduced in 2003. And from 2008 onwards Employment
and Support Allowance has been replacing the previous
incapacity beneﬁts, with a new medical test, new conditionality
and (from 2012 onwards) an extension of means-testing. But
all this effort has had remarkably little impact on the headline
ﬁgures. Clearly, the factors that underpin incapacity claimant
numbers are very powerful indeed.
The key insight again comes from the local numbers. Figure 4
shows the share of adults of working age claiming incapacity-
related beneﬁts in February 2016, by district across the whole
of Britain. It is immediately apparent that there are huge
variations across the country. Moreover the pattern is
systematic. As anyone familiar with the geography of Britain
will quickly note, the highest incapacity claimant rates are
mostly found in older industrial Britain – places such as the
South Wales Valleys, North East England, Merseyside and
Clydeside. In contrast, the incapacity claimant rate in much
of the South and East of England, especially outside London,
is modest.
In fact, 18 of the 20 districts with the highest incapacity
claimant rates cover older industrial areas15. Typically, the
incapacity claimant rate in older industrial Britain is just above
or below 10 per cent, meaning that one-in-ten of all adults
between the ages of 16 and 64 in these places are out of the
labour market on Employment and Support Allowance or (in a
diminishing number of cases) one of its predecessor beneﬁts.
In Blaenau Gwent and Neath Port Talbot in South Wales the
incapacity claimant rate is 11.9 per cent. It is also 11.9 per
cent in Glasgow. In Liverpool it is 10.8 per cent, in Middles-
brough 10.3 per cent and in Stoke-on-Trent 10.1 per cent.
High incapacity claimant rates are emphatically not an issue
in the places where the local economy is strong. Only one
London borough is among the top hundred (Islington at
number 95) and only four other districts in South East England,
all of which cover seaside towns.
Of course, older industrial Britain often has higher underlying
levels of ill health so we might expect to ﬁnd higher incapacity
claimant rates here. But it is worth remembering that the surge
in incapacity claimant numbers in these places only
happened after the industrial jobs began to disappear.
When the mines, steelworks and the like still employed vast
numbers, far more people were actually exposed to damaging
impacts on their health but far fewer made incapacity claims.
It is also worth remembering that ill health or disability is not
necessarily an absolute bar to employment.
What appears to be happening is that where there are plenty
of jobs the men and women with health problems or
disabilities are able to hang on in employment or ﬁnd new
work if they are made redundant. But where the labour market
is difﬁcult – as in older industrial Britain – ill health or disability
ruins many people’s chances of ﬁnding and keeping work.
Employers are well able to recruit the ﬁt and healthy instead.
Poor qualiﬁcations, low-grade work experience and
advancing years all too often compound the difﬁculties the
sick and disabled experience in ﬁnding work.
Additional welfare benefits
This is nevertheless still a long way from attributing more
than a small share of the present-day ﬁscal constraints on
the Treasury to the consequences for the beneﬁts system
of industrial job loss. To expose the full impact we have to
ﬁrst consider the other welfare beneﬁts claimed alongside
incapacity-related beneﬁts.
Employment and Support Allowance, onto which nearly
all incapacity claimants have been moved, is not overly
generous, particularly bearing in mind that most claimants
spend long periods out-of-work on this beneﬁt. The current
(2016) basic rates are £109 a week for an ESA claimant aged
25 or over in the ‘Support Group’ and £102 a week for one in
the ‘Work-Related Activity Group’, though the latter is now
means-tested after twelve months and is soon to be reduced
to £73 a week (the same as Jobseeker’s Allowance) for new
claimants. But in practice many ESA claimants are also
entitled to additional beneﬁts, depending on their personal
and household circumstances, sometimes on an automatic
‘passported’ basis. These include:
• Means-tested top-ups, including for disability
• Disability Living Allowance / Personal Independence
Payments
• Housing Beneﬁt
• Child Tax Credits
• Council Tax Support
• Industrial Injuries Beneﬁt
• Free school meals
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15.The exceptions are
Blackpool and Hastings, two
seaside towns with ailing
local economies.
Figure 4: Incapacity-related benefit
claimant rate by district, February 2016
% of all 16–64 year olds
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Sources: DWP, ONS
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Figure 5: Working age DLA/PIP claimant
rate by district, February 2016
% of all 16–64 year olds
■ 8+
■ 6 to 8
■ 4 to 6
■ 0 to 4
Sources: DWP, ONS
Orkney and Shetland
London
Several of these are widely claimed by ESA claimants. At the
present time a number of these beneﬁts are being merged
into Universal Credit but that does not change the basic point
because the rules governing entitlement are essentially
carried over from the old system.
Disability Living Allowance, which is currently in the process
of being replaced by Personal Independence Payments, is
worth singling out. This is paid to men and women with health
problems or disabilities to help offset the additional costs they
face. In total, 3.65 million men and women claimed DLA or PIP
in February 2016, of whom 2.25 million were of working age.16
The geography of DLA/PIP claims, shown in Figure 5,
is remarkably similar to the geography of incapacity (ESA)
claims. As we noted in a report for the Department for
Workand Pensions in 2009,17 at that time around half of all
incapacity claimants received DLA and around four-out-of-
ﬁve working-age DLA claimants received incapacity beneﬁts.
The report also noted that even in-work DLA claimants were
concentrated in the same places as incapacity claimants.
It is hardly surprising therefore that older industrial areas
account for around three-quarters of the districts with the
highest DLA/ PIP claimant rate – the remaining quarter are all
seaside towns. Neath Port Talbot in South Wales heads the
list, where 11.2 per cent of all 16-64 year olds – one-in-nine of
the working age population – claim Disability Living Allowance
or its replacement PIP. In Glasgow the ﬁgure is 9.7 per cent,
in Liverpool 9.3 per cent and in Barnsley in South Yorkshire
8.6 per cent.
By contrast, there are relatively few DLA/PIP claimants,
either in-work or out-of-work, in the most prosperous local
economies of southern England. Across much of Surrey, for
example, the DLA/PIP claimant rate is below 3 per cent. The
highest ranked London borough (Islington again) comes in
at only 5.6 per cent – 161st out of 379 GB districts.
In essence, DLA/PIP appears to function as an addition to
ESA for many longer-term incapacity claimants whilst some
of those who do return to work then retain their DLA/PIP
entitlement, which is not dependent on employment status.
So just as ESA claims are disproportionately concentrated
in older industrial areas, DLA/PIP claimants are found
disproportionately in older industrial areas as well.
It is not easy to assess precisely how much this all costs.
The Treasury does not publish overall ﬁgures but some
components can be measured directly and others can be
estimated. Table 1, below, shows the results of these
calculations.
The DWP’s own data tells us that £14.9bn a year is spent on
working age incapacity-related beneﬁts, these days nearly
all ESA. To this needs to be added an estimated £7.2bn a year
paid to the same claimants in the form of DLA/PIP, £7bn a year
in Housing Beneﬁt and £3.2bn a year in Tax Credits. The grand
total for the beneﬁts listed in Table 1comes to just under
£34bn a year.
This is a staggering sum and, as far as we are aware, not
one that has previously been highlighted. But let us be quite
clear: we are not arguing that this is ﬁnancial support to which
individuals are not entitled or should not receive. We are
simply drawing attention to the total cost to the Exchequer.
Furthermore, of this immense cost a good proportion –
perhaps £10-14bn a year given the distribution of incapacity
claimants across the country – could be described as the
price of job destruction in older industrial Britain.
The cost of higher claimant unemployment in older industrial
Britain needs to be added to this. The numbers on JSA are far
less than on ESA, as we noted earlier, and some add-on
beneﬁts such as DLA/PIP are less widely claimed by the
claimant unemployed. Jobseeker’s Allowance alone cost the
Exchequer £2.3bn in 2015-16 but if we follow broadly the
same logic as for incapacity claimants (in Table 1) the full cost
of claimant unemployment, adding in other beneﬁts, is more
than £6bn a year.
Table 1: Estimated payments to working-age incapacity claimants, 2015-16
£ bn p.a.
ESA (including means-tested top-ups)(1) 14.9
DLA/PIP(2) 7.2
Housing Beneﬁt(3) 7.0
Child Tax Credit(4) 3.2
Council Tax Support(5) 1.0
Industrial Injuries Beneﬁt(6) 0.4
Free school meals(7) 0.2
Total 33.9
(1) DWP data including residual IB, IS and SDA payments for incapacity
(2) Based on share of working-age DLA/PIP claimants not in work
(3) HB claimants with ESA
(4) Based on number of ESA claimants with children and average payment per out-of-work household
(5) 2012-13 spending of £1.1bn on Council Tax Beneﬁt to incapacity claimants, reduced to reﬂect new scheme
(6) Working age only
(7) Assumes 500,000 children at £400 per year
Source: Sheffield Hallam University estimates based on DWP
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16. Source: DWP.
17. C Beatty, S Fothergill
and D Platts-Fowler (2009)
DLA Claimants: a new
assessment, research report
585, DWP, London.
http://www4.shu.ac.uk/
research/cresr/sites/shu.ac.
uk/ﬁles/dla-claimants-new-
assessment.pdf 
Women’s growing involvement in the labour market adds
a further twist.19 In the places once dominated by heavy
industry the tradition used to be that male wages supported
whole families. Relatively few women with children held paid
employment, especially on a full-time basis. That more women
in these places now look for paid employment should be
welcome progress but they do so in some of the most
problematic labour markets in the country. Local economies
have to grow very fast indeed if they are to not only replace
the jobs that have been lost but also keep up with new labour
supply.  In practice, the growth has been insufﬁcient and the
result has been worklessness, part-time employment and
low wages.
All this has knock-on consequences for the Exchequer. Low
wages generate low tax returns. But at least as importantly,
low wages generate a high bill for in-work beneﬁts. These
include:
• Housing Beneﬁt
• Child Tax Credit
• Working Tax Credit
Spending on in-work beneﬁts is concentrated in the places
where low wages are prevalent and (in the case of Housing
Beneﬁt) where housing costs are high.
To illustrate this point, Figure 6 shows the estimated spending
on Tax Credits, per adult of working age, in every local authority
district across Britain.20 This presents a complex picture
which is by no means a case of older industrial Britain versus
the rest. Wherever low wages are the norm, spending on Tax
Credits is high. This applies in a number of rural areas, in
several seaside towns and in the parts of London where less
well-off residents are concentrated. But it also applies across
most of older industrial Britain. Large families also boost Tax
Credit spending in some places.
Nevertheless, the overlap with the maps shown earlier on job
loss and disability beneﬁts is considerable. In Middlesbrough,
the estimated spending on Tax Credits works out at £1,050 a
year per adult of working age. In Stoke-on-Trent it is £1,000.
Across most of older industrial Britain, in fact, it exceeds £850.
The equivalent ﬁgure in Guildford in Surrey is just £290 a year,
and in Kensington and Chelsea £310.
So we are arguing that the job destruction in older industrial
Britain has resulted not only in higher spending on out-of-
work beneﬁts but also higher spending on in-work beneﬁts
and depressed tax revenue.
ESA and the additional benefits
received by ESA claimants – Housing
Benefit and Disability Living Allowance
for example – are a £30bn-plus annual
claim on the Exchequer.
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18.M Foden, S Fothergill
and T Gore (2014) op. cit.
19.See C Beatty,
S Fothergill, D Houston,
R Powell and P Sissons
(2009) ‘A gendered theory of
employment, unemployment
and sickness’, Environment
and Planning C, vol. 27,
pp. 958-974.
20.Based on the average
payment per claimant in
2014-15 and the number
of claimants in each local
authority in April 2016.
Source: HMRC.
Once more, only part of this cost can be attributed to the
destruction of jobs in industrial Britain and it is worth bearing
in mind that there is always some unemployment even in fully-
employed local economies. But if we assume that around half
the claimant unemployment in older industrial Britain is rooted
in job loss, and bear in mind that these places have rather
more than 40 per cent of all GB unemployment, the higher
claimant unemployment arising from industrial job destruction
probably costs the Exchequer another £1-1.5bn a year.
In-work benefits
The full cost to the Exchequer is greater still however. One of
the deﬁning features of the industrial jobs that have been lost
on such a grand scale is that they were often relatively high
value-added, high wage jobs. The skilled manual jobs in
manufacturing are now far fewer in number. There are more
well-paid professionals in the modern economy, and more
poorly paid service workers, but fewer in between.
Nowhere is this clearer than in older industrial Britain. In these
places there has been job growth in the wake of industrial
decline, as our ﬁgures for the coalﬁelds demonstrate,18 but
all too often it has been in low-productivity, low-wage activities.
In the former coalﬁelds for example, two of the prime sources
of new jobs have been call centres and warehouses. The
Yorkshire, Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire coalﬁelds, for
instance, have a central location and ready access to the
motorway network and have become prime destinations for
national distribution depots. A well-publicised example, on
the site of the former Shirebrook Colliery in Derbyshire, is the
national warehouse of Sports Direct, where most of the work-
force is employed on zero-hours contracts and low wages.
Beyond the call centre and warehouses, the seemingly
relentless growth in consumer spending has fuelled job
growth in shops, hotels, pubs, restaurants and takeaways.
Few of these new jobs are well paid, and many are part-time.
It is the weakness of labour demand in older industrial Britain,
stripped of its once dominant employers, that has enabled
the new employers to get away with paying low wages.
The ex-miners and ex-steelworkers may have baulked at the
prospect of work in a call centre or warehouse and opted out
of the labour market instead, cushioned by redundancy pay,
early entitlement to pensions and disability beneﬁts, but their
sons and daughters have never faced the same choices. With
little possibility of remaining on Jobseeker’s Allowance for
long periods, they have had to accept whatever work they
can ﬁnd, particularly as unscrupulous employers have been
quick to turn to migrant workers from Eastern Europe as an
alternative supply of pliant, low-wage labour.
Figure 6: Estimated annual spending
on Tax Credits by district
£ per working age adult p.a.
■ 800+
■ 650 to 800
■ 500 to 650
■ 0 to 500
Sources: HMRC, ONS
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These features of the contemporary UK economy are deeply
interrelated. In essence, Britain is living beyond its means.
Consumption and living standards are being sustained not
by incomes earned by trading with each other and the rest of
the world but by ever-rising debt and the sale of UK assets –
companies, property, government bonds – to foreign
investors.
That debt has become the driver of UK economic growth
is ﬁrst and foremost the result of the erosion of the UK’s
industrial base. The UK no longer sells enough to the rest
of the world to pay for what it imports.  And the UK
manufacturing sector has become so hollowed-out that
even a substantial devaluation of sterling, such as occurred
in the wake of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis and more recently in
the wake of the Brexit vote, no longer provides sufﬁcient
stimulus to bring foreign trade back into balance.
Of course, the UK does not rely just on manufacturing to pay
for imports. The economy has proved exceptionally good
at selling services to the rest of the world – ﬁnance, legal,
design, media, education and the rest – but this success has
never been enough to offset the industrial failures. The fact
remains that around half the value of all UK exports still comes
from manufacturing and that manufacturing, with just 10 per
cent of the UK workforce, sells as much to the rest of the world
as the other 90 per cent put together.
The point here is that contemporary public ﬁnances are
undermined not only by the direct cost of welfare beneﬁts in
former industrial Britain but also by the inability of a weakened
manufacturing sector to deliver the sustainable growth that
the economy so clearly needs.
It is impossible to put a reliable ﬁgure on the cost in terms of
in-work beneﬁts and lost tax revenue. However, Tax Credits
paid to in-work households cost the Exchequer almost £20bn
a year,21 and Housing Beneﬁt to in-work households rather
more than £5bn a year.  If low pay also means that the Treasury
receives £1,000 a year less in tax from (say) 5 million workers –
one-in-six of the workforce – that would be a further £5bn a
year.22 Add these together and the Exchequer cost of low pay
is perhaps £30bn a year. Bearing in mind the prevalence of low
pay across older industrial Britain, perhaps £10bn a year might
be attributed to the destructionof well-paid industrial jobs.
If we add this admittedly speculative ﬁgure to the earlier, more
robust estimates of the costs of ESA and JSA claims, the
present-day cost to the Exchequer, in welfare payments and
lost tax revenue, of the destruction of jobs in industrial Britain
almost certainly exceeds £20bn a year.
Lower output, lower incomes
There is a ﬁnal way in which the destruction of industry has
undermined public ﬁnances. This is through the erosion of the
UK’s export base, and this is arguably the most powerful
effect of all. This is not something our own research has
addressed but it would be wrong to overlook here.
The UK economy in 2016 seems remarkably prosperous.
GDP exceeds pre-ﬁnancial crisis levels, inﬂation is low, and
overall employment has reached record highs. But the
prosperity is deeply precarious, and not simply because of the
uncertainties created by impending departure from the EU.
As the government itself could not deny, the contemporary
economy displays a number of alarming features:
• An extraordinary level of household debt – among the very 
highest in the world
• A trade deﬁcit with the rest of the world, in goods and
services, at record peacetime levels
• A public sector budget deﬁcit that remains large despite
the most draconian austerity measures in modern times
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21.2014-15 spending data.
Source: HMRC.
22.2015-16 spending data.
Source: HMRC.
The orthodox solution: welfare cuts
Faced with a budget deﬁcit that is high and has proved slow
to bring down, successive governments have chosen to
tackle the symptoms rather than the underlying causes
A key symptom has of course been the high spending on
working-age welfare beneﬁts. As we have argued, this should
really be understood as a result of economic failure rather
than of ﬁnancial generosity. If spending on out-of-work
beneﬁts is too high, especially in older industrial Britain, it is
because there aren’t enough jobs to absorb all the potential
labour supply, and if spending on in-work beneﬁts is too high
in the same places it is because too many of the jobs that do
exist pay low wages. This is not, however, how the Treasury
has interpreted the problem.
The pre-2010 Labour Government was far from immune to
Treasury orthodoxy and from 2008 onwards began to replace
old-style incapacity beneﬁts by Employment and Support
Allowance, with a new medical test and greater conditionality.
The Coalition Government that then took ofﬁce introduced
a major round of cuts to welfare beneﬁts and its wholly
Conservative successor, elected in 2015, has carried on
with a further major round.
The cuts fall on three main areas of welfare spending:
• In-work beneﬁts such as Tax Credits and Child Beneﬁt
• Housing beneﬁts in the private rented sector and social 
housing, including Council Tax Support
• Disability beneﬁts, including ESA and the changeover
from DLA to PIP
Additionally, the value of most working-age beneﬁts is being
frozen for four years from 2016, so as a result of inﬂation
claimants will receive less in real terms even if they continue
to qualify.
The Coalition Government also initiated the introduction of
Universal Credit to replace most working-age beneﬁts, which
is only now beginning to take effect on a large scale. In its
original form, Universal Credit was not intended to reduce
the beneﬁt bill directly but rather to introduce a standardised
withdrawal rate. In practice, Universal Credit will now pay less
than its predecessors because entitlement is reduced at lower
income levels than was previously the case with Tax Credits.
A distinguishing feature of the welfare reforms is that they
focus almost exclusively on working age claimants. By
contrast, spending on state pensions – by far the largest
component of welfare spending –  has been entirely
unaffected. The quite explicit assumption has been that
reductions in working-age beneﬁts incentivise claimants
to ﬁnd work. The new Beneﬁt Cap for example, which sets
a ceiling on the sum total of beneﬁts paid to a household,
applies only to out-of-work claimants under state pension
age. By targeting in-work beneﬁts as well, the reforms also
assume that reduced entitlement will encourage claimants
to ﬁnd a better paid job or work longer hours. All this has been
backed up increasing conditionality and the wider application
of sanctions, for example to unemployed JSA claimants.
Low pay in former industrial areas
depresses tax revenue and inflates
spending on in-work benefits.
Spending on Tax Credits, for example,
exceeds £850 a year per adult of
working age in much of older industrial
Britain – double the level in parts of
southern England.
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Figure 7 shows where across Britain this ﬁnancial loss is
occurring.27 The methods underpinning these estimates
are set out in full in our 2016 report. In essence, they take the
Treasury’s own estimates of the ﬁnancial loss and translate
them down to the local level using a range of ofﬁcial statistics
on claimant numbers and spending. The measure shown in
this map is the average loss per adult of working age – in other
words the ﬁnancial loss spread across all 16-64 year olds,
including those not in receipt of welfare beneﬁts. This is the
best measure of the intensity of the ‘hit’ in each place.
The map shows the annual ﬁnancial loss that can now be
expected by 2020-21 as a result of all the post-2010
welfare reforms.
If this map show similarities with those presented earlier it is
not accidental. Welfare cuts inevitably impact most in the
places where claimants are concentrated. So it is no surprise
that Britain’s older industrial areas ﬁgure so prominently
among the worst-hit places. Once more, it is places such as
South Wales, the industrial North from Merseyside across to
the Humber, North East England and the West of Scotland
that stand out, whilst large parts of southern England around
London are much less affected by the welfare changes.
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27.Figure 7 has been
up-dated to incorporate
revised Treasury estimates
of the ﬁnancial losses,
published in Budget 2016.
To put this another way, the assumption framing welfare policy
is that unemployment and low pay are the fault of individuals.
Claimants have let themselves become “dependent” on
welfare beneﬁts and they should choose to “do the right
thing” and instead ﬁnd work or increase their earnings.23
This is a quite different view to the one we have set out here,
which is that high spending on welfare beneﬁts is the result
of economic failure. The Treasury’s orthodoxy makes the
mistake of taking welfare spending out of its economic
context. If the Treasury had a better understanding of what
has happened to the economy of older industrial Britain
it might not be so keen to blame welfare spending on the
workshy or feckless.
We ﬁrst documented the uneven impact of the welfare
reforms in a report published in 2013.24 In an updated report
in 201625 we calculated that the pre-2015 welfare reforms
had by March 2016 resulted in a loss to claimants of £14.5bn
a year. The Treasury’s own ﬁgures show that the reforms
now in the pipeline will result in a further loss of £12.3bn a
year by 2020-21.26 That brings the cumulative total to almost
£27bn a year.
The Treasury has misdiagnosed high
welfare spending as the result of
inadequate work incentives and has
too often blamed individuals for their
own predicament, whereas in fact a
large part of the bill is rooted in job
destruction extending back decades.
23.For examples of this
language see Department
for Work and Pensions
(2015) Welfare Reform and
Work Bill: impact
assessment for the benefit
cap, DWP, London.
http://www.parliament.uk/
documents/impact-
assessments/IA15-006.pdf 
24.C Beatty and S Fothergill
(2013) Hitting the Poorest
Places Hardest: the local and
regional impact of welfare
reform, CRESR, Shefﬁeld
Hallam University.
http://www4.shu.ac.uk/
research/cresr/sites/shu.ac.
uk/ﬁles/hitting-poorest-
places-hardest_0.pdf 
25. C Beatty and S Fothergill
(2016) The Uneven Impact
of Welfare Reform: the
financial losses to places and
people, CRESR, Shefﬁeld
Hallam University.
http://www4.shu.ac.uk/
research/cresr/sites/shu.ac.
uk/ﬁles/welfare-reform-
2016_1.pdf  
26.This is a revised ﬁgure
taking into account new data
published in Budget 2016
and differs from the ﬁgure
published in Beatty and
Fothergill (2016) op. cit.
Figure 7: Anticipated loss by 2020-21
arising from all post-2010 welfare
reforms, by district
£ per working age adult p.a.
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■ 650 to 800
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Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data
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In Middlesbrough by 2020-21, the ﬁnancial loss from all the
post-2010 welfare reforms is estimated to exceed £1,000 a
year per adult of working age. This is an average loss across
all 16-64 year olds, including non-claimants. For those actually
in receipt of welfare beneﬁts the average ﬁnancial loss will
obviously be larger – sometimes much larger. In Bradford the
average loss per working age adult is £970 a year, in Oldham
£950 a year, and in Merthyr Tydﬁl in the heart of the Welsh
Valleys £920 a year. Across most of older industrial Britain the
loss exceeds £750 a year. In Cambridge the equivalent ﬁgure
is just £340 a year.
In fairness, older industrial Britain is not the only place hit
hard by welfare reform. A number of less prosperous seaside
towns are also hit hard, and a number of low-wage rural areas.
Some parts of London also lose large sums, particularly
because of the reductions in support for housing costs.
Nevertheless, it is not difﬁcult to argue that communities in
older industrial Britain are now being meted out punishment
in the form of welfare cuts for the destruction wrought to their
industrial base all those years ago.
The welfare reforms implemented since
2010, and strengthened since the 2015
general election, hit the poorest places
hardest. In effect, communities in older
industrial Britain are being meted out
punishment in the form of welfare cuts
for the destruction wrought to their
industrial base.
The scale of disparities: a summary
To underline the extent to which older industrial Britain differs
from the most prosperous parts of the country, and to highlight
the cost to the Treasury and communities, Figure 8draws a
number of comparisons based on the data presented earlier
in Figures 4-7. The averages across 30 local authorities in
older industrial Britain, spread across the North, Scotland and
Wales, are compared with the equivalent averages for 30 local
authorities in the prosperous parts of South East and Eastern
England.28 London is also included for comparative purposes.
London is arguably the most prosperous place of all but it is
also home to substantial poverty and the beneﬁt bill there is
boosted by high housing costs.
The comparisons are intended to be illustrative but they do
make a number of telling points:
• In older industrial Britain, the incapacity (ESA) claimant rate
is nearly three times higher than in the prosperous parts of 
southern England, and double the rate in London
• The disability (DLA/PIP) claimant rate in older industrial 
Britain is also nearly three times higher than in the 
prosperous parts of the South, and double that in London
• In older industrial Britain, per capita spending on Tax
Credits – a key in-work beneﬁt – is more than double the 
level in the prosperous South, and more than a third higher 
than in London.
• The cuts in welfare spending take twice as much in older 
industrial Britain as in the prosperous South, and 20 per cent 
more than in London even though London is hit hard by 
changes to Housing Beneﬁt.
Older industrial %
London %
Southern %
9.7
5.1
3.3
Incapacity claimant rate, 2016
Older industrial %
London %
Southern %
8.6
4.2
3.3
Working age DLA/PIP claimant rate, 2016
Older industrial  £
London  £
Southern  £
880
650
400
Tax Credits per working age adult, 2015-16
Older industrial  £
London  £
Southern  £
860
710
420
Loss per working age adult from post-2010 welfare reforms,
by 2020-21
Figure 8: Disparities across Britain
Sources: DWP, HMRC, ONS and Sheffield Hallam  estimates based on official data
30 older industrial LAs:Barnsley, Barrow-in-Furness, Blackburn with Darwen, Blaenau Gwent, Bolsover, Bradford, Caerphilly, Chesterfield, Doncaster, Dundee, E Ayrshire, Glasgow,
Hartlepool, Hull, Inverclyde, Knowsley, Liverpool, Mansfield, Merthyr Tydfil, Middlesbrough, Neath Port Talbot, N Lanarkshire, Oldham, Redcar & Cleveland, Rhondda Cynon Taf, Rotherham,
S Tyneside, Stoke-on-Trent, Sunderland, Wigan
30 southern LAs:Aylesbury Vale, Basingstoke & Deane, Bracknell Forest, Brentwood, Cambridge, Central Bedfordshire, Chelmsford, Chiltern, Eastleigh, Epsom & Ewell, Fareham,
Guildford, Hart, Horsham, Huntingdonshire, Mid Sussex, Oxford, Reigate & Banstead, Sevenoaks, S Bucks, S Cambridgeshire, S Oxfordshire, St Albans, Tunbridge Wells, W Oxfordshire,
Winchester, Windsor & Maidenhead, Woking, Wokingham, Wycombe
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28. These are all unweighted
averages.
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Is there is an alternative?
Our argument is that for many communities the pain caused in
the past by industrial job loss and the pain suffered today as a
result of welfare reform are inextricably linked. By taking a long
view of economic change, and by drilling down to evidence at
the local level, these connections are all too apparent.
But if welfare cuts represent the orthodox Treasury-driven
response to the budget deﬁcit, is there an alternative? The
re-creation of the past, or more speciﬁcally of the levels of
industrial employment last seen in Britain two generations
ago, is not really an option. Technology has moved on, so
that even if Britain did produce vastly more cars, machinery,
electronics or whatever, far fewer men and women would
be employed in these industries than would once have been
the case.
That in 2016 the new Prime Minister, Theresa May, has ﬁnally
inserted ‘Industrial Strategy’ into the name of the Department
for Business is perhaps a sign that all is no longer well with the
Treasury orthodoxy, though critics might argue this is a case
of too little, too late. But if the name change does indeed
signal a change of direction the new way forward still remains
to be deﬁned. This is not the place to try to set out the details
but two principles should perhaps be central to an alternative
to the Treasury’s traditional approach.
First, the rhetoric about rebalancing the economyneeds to
be turned into reality. In the wake of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis
there was much talk of the need to move away from an over-
reliance on ﬁnancial services towards an economy based
more on exports and investment. The former Chancellor,
George Osborne, called for “the march of the makers”. This
hasn’t happened. If anything, the UK economy is now more
imbalanced than before the ﬁnancial crisis and if growth has
returned – for the moment – it is because the old economic
model based on debt and the housing market has been
rekindled one more time.
Across most of older industrial Britain
the loss arising from welfare reform
is expected to exceed £750 a year per
working age adult by 2020-21.
There is an alternative – a genuine
rebalancing of the economy in favour
of industrial production and a revival
of regional economic policy.
A genuine revival in industrial production would be central
to any rebalancing of the UK economy. This should not be
regarded as impossible, even against the backdrop of
competition from China. It is salutary to remember that in
Germany, where labour costs are generally even higher than
in the UK, the share of GDP accounted for by manufacturing
is twice the level in the UK. In no small part as a result, Germany
has a large trade surplus and a far smaller budget deﬁcit.
The UK needs to become more like Germany. A rebalancing
of the UK economy in favour of industry would be of direct
beneﬁt to much of older industrial Britain because, even after
years of job loss, that is where so much of what remains of
UK manufacturing is still located.
The other principle central to an alternative to the Treasury’s
welfare cuts is a revival of regional economic policy. The
places where welfare claimants are concentrated, out-of-
work or on low wages, need to be grown fastest. This doesn’t
necessarily mean the creation of new administrative structures
or adherence to any speciﬁc geographical scale of action –
regional, sub-regional, city-region. Rather, what is important
is that policies are in place to channel economic growth to the
places that need it most, where in turn the welfare bill can
be reduced most.
At the present time, the UK probably has its weakest regional
economic policies since the Second World War. Indeed, what
masquerades as regional policy is more often the promotion
of competition between places, which in practice often widens
the differences in economic well-being, or the devolution of
powers to local authorities, which is really about governance
and has the most tenuous connection to prosperity. The
dominating position of London, in particular, has gone
unchallenged even though the downsides of the capital’s
success – congestion and stratospheric property prices –
are all too evident.
The starting point needs to be that the economies of older
industrial Britain can be rebuilt. The prize is lower spending
on welfare, higher tax revenue, and a reduction in the budget
deﬁcit that is not based upon hitting the poorest place hardest.
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Policy makers need to take
a long-term perspective,
look at the differences
between places, and stop
thinking in silos.
Lessons for analysis and policy
In conclusion, let us return to the theme at the very start of
this paper: that the focus on the short term obscures longer-
term issues and trends. We have endeavoured to explain here
how the destruction of industrial Britain in the 1980s still has
profound repercussions for present-day public ﬁnances.
What does this tell us about the way policy makers should
go about understanding issues?
First and most obviously, it underlines the importance of a
long-term perspective. Where we are now, as a society, is
the product of long and still evolving economic processes.
The ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 is not the deﬁning event in Britain’s
recent economic history, nor even the main cause of the
present budget deﬁcit. The source of many current problems
lies much deeper in the destruction of Britain’s industrial base
in the 1980s and all that has ﬂowed from it.
Second, it is hard to understand what is happening to the
economy or society without looking at the differences
between places. It is disturbing that the Treasury and most
of the economics profession rarely if ever look beyond
national data and national trends. They end up failing to grasp
causality and misdiagnose problems. A good example is the
rise in incapacity numbers and spending, which has been
wrongly identiﬁed as an issue of work incentives, not as the
consequence of job destruction in speciﬁc parts of the country.
Third, there is a pressing need to stop thinking in silos.
Jobs, or the lack of them, and public ﬁnances are profoundly
interconnected. The Department for Work and Pensions
cannot hope to create jobs for all merely by adjustments
to beneﬁt payment rates and conditions. Nor can the
Treasury deliver full employment simply by eliminating the
budget deﬁcit. Where we are now is the result of astonishing
negligence and short-sightedness. Allowing Britain’s
industrial base to wither so dramatically has not been cost-
less and it has certainly not been absorbed by the smooth
operation of market forces. It has resulted in persistent
worklessness, low wages, an inﬂated welfare bill and an
alarming trade deﬁcit with the rest of the world.
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